

# Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council (BCP)

## Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2022/23

### Introduction

#### Background

- 1 The Council defines its treasury management activities as: “The management of the local authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.” Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that the cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council’s low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 2 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council’s capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

#### **2021 revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code and Prudential Code – changes which will impact on future TMSS/AIS reports and the risk management framework**

- 3 CIPFA published the revised codes on 20th December 2021 and has stated that formal adoption is not required until the 2023/24 financial year. This Council has to have regard to these codes of practice when it prepares the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy, and also related reports during the financial year, which are taken to Full Council for approval.
- 4 The revised codes will have the following implications:
  - a requirement for the Council to adopt a new debt liability benchmark treasury indicator to support the financing risk management of the capital financing requirement;
  - clarify what CIPFA expects a local authority to borrow for and what they do not view as appropriate. This will include the requirement to set a proportionate approach to commercial and service capital investment;
  - address ESG issues within the Capital Strategy;
  - require implementation of a policy to review commercial property, with a view to divest where appropriate;
  - create new Investment Practices to manage risks associated with non-treasury investment (similar to the current Treasury Management Practices);
  - ensure that any long term treasury investment is supported by a business

model;

- a requirement to effectively manage liquidity and longer term cash flow requirements;
  - amendment to TMP1 to address ESG policy within the treasury management risk framework;
  - amendment to the knowledge and skills register for individuals involved in the treasury management function - to be proportionate to the size and complexity of the treasury management conducted by each council;
  - a new requirement to clarify reporting requirements for service and commercial investment, (especially where supported by borrowing/leverage).
- 5 In addition, all investments and investment income must be attributed to one of the following three purposes: -

#### **Treasury management**

Arising from the organisation's cash flows or treasury risk management activity, this type of investment represents balances which are only held until the cash is required for use. Treasury investments may also arise from other treasury risk management activity which seeks to prudently manage the risks, costs or income relating to existing or forecast debt or treasury investments.

#### **Service delivery**

Investments held primarily and directly for the delivery of public services including housing, regeneration and local infrastructure. Returns on this category of investment which are funded by borrowing are permitted only in cases where the income is "either related to the financial viability of the project in question or otherwise incidental to the primary purpose".

#### **Commercial return**

Investments held primarily for financial return with no treasury management or direct service provision purpose. Risks on such investments should be proportionate to a council's financial capacity – i.e., that 'plausible losses' could be absorbed in budgets or reserves without unmanageable detriment to local services. An authority must not borrow to invest primarily for financial return.

- 6 As this Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy deals solely with treasury management investments, the categories of service delivery and commercial investments will be dealt with as part of the Capital Strategy report. However, as investments in commercial property have implications for cash balances managed by the treasury team, it will be for each authority to determine whether they feel it is relevant to add a high level summary of the impact that commercial investments have, or may have, if it is planned to liquidate such investments within the three year time horizon of this report, (or a longer time horizon if that is felt appropriate).
- 7 Members will be updated on how all these changes will impact our current approach and any changes required will be formally adopted within the 2023/24 TMSS report.

## Reporting Requirements

### Capital Strategy

- 8 The CIPFA revised 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities will prepare an additional report, a capital strategy report, which will provide the following:
- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
  - an overview of how the associated risk is managed
  - the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full Council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

This capital strategy is reported separately from the Treasury Management Strategy Statement; non-treasury investments will be reported through the former. This ensures the separation of the core treasury function under security, liquidity and yield principles, and the policy and commercialism investments usually driven by expenditure on an asset.

### Treasury Management Reporting

- 9 The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.
- 10 **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** - The first, and most important report covers:
- a The capital plans (including prudential indicators);
  - b A minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
  - c The treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
  - d An investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).
- 11 **Periodic treasury management report** – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators if necessary, and whether any policies require revision. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Committee.
- 12 **An annual treasury management report** – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.
- 13 The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Governance Committee.

### Treasury Management Strategy for 2022/23

- 14 The strategy for 2022/23 covers two main areas:

### **Capital issues**

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

### **Treasury management issues**

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

15 These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, DLUHC Investment Guidance, DLUHC MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code.

### **Training**

16 The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. Training was provided to all members on the 7<sup>th</sup> January 2020 with support from the Councils Treasury Management advisors. It is planned that more training will be provided during the summer of 2022.

17 The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### **Treasury management consultants**

18 The Councils Treasury Management advisors are Link Asset Services.

19 The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources.

## **The Capital Prudential Indicators 2022/23 – 2024/25**

20 The Council's capital expenditure plans have a key influence over the treasury management activity. The capital expenditure plans are reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' in considering the impact and risk of this Council's capital expenditure plans.

### **Capital expenditure**

21 This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital expenditure	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000	2023/24 Estimate £'000	2024/25 Estimate £'000
General Fund	97,568	151,529	132,076	35,956
HRA	40,672	59,757	49,145	25,522
<b>Total</b>	<b>138,240</b>	<b>211,286</b>	<b>181,221</b>	<b>61,478</b>

22 The following tables summarise the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

### General Fund Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000	2023/24 Estimate £'000	2024/25 Estimate £'000
<b>General Fund Total</b>	<b>97,568</b>	<b>151,529</b>	<b>132,076</b>	<b>35,956</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>				
Capital receipts	7	93	-	-
Capital grants & Contributions	52,207	75,583	43,560	14,140
Revenue Contributions	588	518	518	518
Reserve Contributions	1,191	778	189	-
Prudential Borrowing (inc HRA Transfers)	43,575	74,557	87,809	21,298
<b>Total financing for the year</b>	<b>97,568</b>	<b>151,529</b>	<b>132,076</b>	<b>35,956</b>

### HRA Capital Expenditure

Capital expenditure	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000	2023/24 Estimate £'000	2024/25 Estimate £'000
<b>HRA Total</b>	<b>40,672</b>	<b>59,757</b>	<b>49,145</b>	<b>25,522</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>				
Capital receipts	3,719	8,258	3,041	1,710
Major Repairs Allowance	17,976	12,718	11,739	12,115
Other Contributions	2,485	1,675	-	-
Reserve Contributions	16,492	11,315	7,647	8,502
Prudential Borrowing	-	25,791	26,717	3,195
<b>Total financing for the year</b>	<b>40,672</b>	<b>59,757</b>	<b>49,145</b>	<b>25,522</b>

### The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

23 The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which

has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

- 24 The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each asset's life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.
- 25 The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes.
- 26 The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections overleaf:

	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000	2023/24 Estimate £'000	2024/25 Estimate £'000
<b>Capital Financing Requirement</b>				
CFR – General Fund	345,161	445,509	560,035	584,528
CFR – HRA	142,022	167,987	193,974	196,369
CFR - IAS16 leases estimated impact	-	7,000	7,000	7,000
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>487,183</b>	<b>620,496</b>	<b>761,009</b>	<b>787,897</b>
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	30,664	133,313	140,513	26,888
<b>Movement in CFR represented by</b>				
Net movement in borrowing for the year (above)	44,766	101,127	114,715	24,493
CFR - IAS16 leases estimated impact	0	7,000	0	0
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	(13,041)	(16,410)	(18,938)	(19,352)
<b>Movement in CFR</b>	<b>31,725</b>	<b>91,717</b>	<b>95,777</b>	<b>5,141</b>

- 27 A key aspect of the regulatory and professional guidance is that elected members are aware of the size and scope of any borrowing in relation to the authority's overall financial position. The capital expenditure figures and the details above demonstrate the scope of this activity and, by approving these figures, consider the scale proportionate to the Council's remaining activity.

## Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) policy statement

- 28 The Council is required to make a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP). It is a statutory requirement to make a charge to the Council's General Fund to make provision for the repayment of the Council's past capital debt and other credit liabilities.
- 29 DLUHC regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to Councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement.

- 30 For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be either:
- **Existing practice** - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former CLG regulations (option 1);
  - **Based on CFR** – MRP will be based on the CFR (option 2);
- 31 These options provide for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.
- 32 From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be either:
- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (option 3);
  - **Depreciation method** – MRP will follow standard depreciation accounting procedures (option 4);
- 33 The type of approach intended by the MRP guidance is clearly to enable local circumstances and discretion to play a part, as the guidance in general contains a set of recommendations rather than representing a prescriptive process. The guidance makes it clear that Councils can follow an alternative approach, provided they still make a prudent provision.
- 34 It was agreed by members of previous Councils that the following MRP policy was applied from 2016/17 onwards:
- In respect of all supported borrowing, capital expenditure incurred prior to 2016/17 (excluding assets acquired under PFI or finance lease arrangements) MRP will be provided at a rate of 2% on a straight-line basis to ensure the balance is fully cleared over the period in line with the useful life of the assets.
  - In respect of all unsupported borrowing, capital expenditure incurred prior to 2016/17 (excluding assets acquired under PFI or finance lease arrangements) the Council will apply the Asset life method as used in previous years and will apply an average life of 25 years for the unsupported borrowing requirement to be repaid over based on historical schemes that have required and applied unsupported borrowing.
  - MRP charges from 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2016 exceeded what prudence required during the period under this revised policy. There will be a realignment of MRP charged to the revenue account in 2016/17 and subsequent years to recognise this excess sum. Total MRP after applying realignment will not be less than zero in any financial year.
  - In respect of capital expenditure incurred in 2016/17 and subsequent financial years MRP will be provided at a rate of 4% on the written down balance.
- 35 In 2017/18 a proposed change was made that the 4% write down method will be used for all assets except for significant individual schemes exceeding £10m (such as asset investments) for which the specific asset life will be used for MRP purposes.

- 36 To allow for further flexibility in the Council MRP policy the Council will look at using specific asset life for individual schemes to ensure the debt repayments are reflective of the value these assets bring. Assets under construction which have yet to fully deliver their expected benefits will not be subject to MRP charges to the Revenue Account until such time as they become operational for a full accounting year. Accordingly, on becoming operational, the charge for MRP will not commence until the following financial year.
- 37 There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision but there is a requirement for a charge for depreciation to be made (although there are transitional arrangements in place).
- 38 Repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

## Borrowing

- 39 The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### Current portfolio position

- 40 The overall Treasury Management portfolio as at 31 March 2021 and for the position as at 31 December 2021 are shown below for both borrowing and investments.

	Actual 31/03/2021 £'000	Actual 31/03/2021 %	Current 31/12/2021 £'000	Current 31/12/2021 %
<b>Treasury investments</b>				
Money Market Funds	0	0%	54,235	32%
Bank Deposits	25,180	44%	91,050	54%
Local Authorities	20,000	35%	0	0%
DMO	0	0%	0	0%
Call Account	11,505	40%	22,825	14%
<b>Total Treasury Investments</b>	<b>56,685</b>	<b>119%</b>	<b>168,110</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Treasury External Borrowing</b>				
PWLB	141,938	73%	191,729	75%
Local Authorities	35,000	18%	0	0%
Private Sector	17,046	9%	65,227	25%
Salix	507	0%	255	0%
<b>Total External Borrowing</b>	<b>194,491</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>257,211</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Net treasury investment / (borrowing)</b>	<b>(137,806)</b>		<b>(89,101)</b>	

- 41 The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.



	2021/22 Estimate £'000	2022/23 Estimate £'000	2023/24 Estimate £'000	2024/25 Estimate £'000
<b>External Debt</b>				
Treasury Debt at 1 April	194,798	285,545	305,545	355,545
PFI and Finance Lease Liability	8,443	7,943	7,443	6,943
Expected change in Debt	90,747	20,000	50,000	50,000
<b>Actual gross debt at 31 March</b>	<b>293,988</b>	<b>313,488</b>	<b>362,988</b>	<b>412,488</b>
<b>The Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>487,183</b>	<b>620,496</b>	<b>761,009</b>	<b>787,897</b>
<b>Under / (over) borrowing</b>	<b>193,195</b>	<b>307,008</b>	<b>398,021</b>	<b>375,409</b>

- 42 Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current year and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.
- 43 The Council has complied with their prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future due to the large under borrowing requirement. This view considers current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

#### **Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity**

- 44 **The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.
- 45 **The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.
- a This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all Councils' plans, or those of a specific Council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
- b The Audit and Governance Committee is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

	2021/22 Estimate £m	2022/23 Estimate £m	2023/24 Estimate £m	2024/25 Estimate £m
Operational boundary	797	855	855	855
Authorised limit	847	905	905	905

#### **Prospects for interest rates**

- 46 The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided

the following forecasts on 20th December 2021. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80 bps. The following table gives their view on the base rate and PWLB borrowing costs.

Link Group Interest Rate View		20.12.21													
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	

47 Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16th December 2021.

48 As shown in the forecast table above, the forecast for Bank Rate now includes four increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.

### Investment and borrowing rates

49 Investment returns are expected to improve in 2022/23. However, while markets are pricing in a series of Bank Rate hikes, actual economic circumstances may see the MPC fall short of these elevated expectations.

50 Borrowing interest rates fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.

51 On 25 November 2020, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows: -

- PWLB Standard Rate is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- PWLB Certainty Rate is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
- PWLB HRA Standard Rate is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- PWLB HRA Certainty Rate is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
- Local Infrastructure Rate is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

52 Borrowing for capital expenditure. Links long-term (beyond 10 years), forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As some PWLB certainty rates are currently below 2.00%, there remains value in considering long-term borrowing from the PWLB where

appropriate. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio. In addition, there are also some cheap alternative sources of long-term borrowing if an authority is seeking to avoid a “cost of carry” but also wishes to mitigate future re-financing risk.

- 53 While BCP Council will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and the rundown of reserves, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

### **Borrowing strategy**

- 54 The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council’s reserves, balances and cash flow have been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that need to be considered.
- 55 The Chief Financial Officer has the delegated responsibility to arrange such loans as are legally permitted to meet the Council’s borrowing requirement and to arrange terms of all loans to the Council including amounts, periods and rates of interest.
- 56 Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2022/23 treasury operations. The Chief Financial Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:
- a. if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates, then borrowing will be postponed.
  - b. if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

Any decisions will be reported to the appropriate decision making body at the next available opportunity.

### **Policy on borrowing in advance of need**

- 57 The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.
- 58 Risks associated with any borrowing in advance of activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

## Debt rescheduling

- 59 Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur as there is still a very large difference between premature redemption rates and new borrowing rates, even though the general margin of PWLB rates over gilt yields was reduced by 100 bps in November 2020.
- 60 If rescheduling was done, it will be reported to the Audit and Governance Committee, at the earliest meeting following its action.

## Approved Sources of Long- and Short-term Borrowing

On Balance Sheet	Fixed	Variable
PWLB	●	●
Community municipal bonds	●	●
Municipal bond agency	●	●
Local authorities	●	●
Banks	●	●
Pension funds	●	●
Insurance companies	●	●
Market (long-term)	●	●
Market (temporary)	●	●
Market (LOBOs)	●	●
Stock issues	●	●
Local temporary	●	●
Local Bonds	●	●
Local authority bills	●	●
Overdraft	●	●
Negotiable Bonds	●	●
Internal (capital receipts & revenue balances)	●	●
Commercial Paper	●	●
Medium Term Notes	●	●
Finance leases	●	●

## Annual Investment Strategy

### Investment Policy

- 61 The Department of Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) and CIPFA have extended the meaning of ‘investments’ to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets, are covered in the Capital Strategy, (a separate report).
- 62 The Council’s investment policy has regard to the following: -
- DLUHC’s Guidance on Local Government Investments (“the Guidance”)
  - CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 (“the Code”)
  - CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

**The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).**

- 63 In accordance with the above guidance from the DLUHC and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.
- 64 Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 65 Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

**Creditworthiness policy**

- 66 The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:
- a It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
  - b It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.
- 67 The Chief Financial Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to which types of investment instruments that can be used as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.
- 68 Credit rating information is supplied by Link Asset Services, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating outlooks (notification of a possible longer-term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur, and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.
- 69 The criteria for providing a pool of high-quality investment counterparties (both specified and non-specified investments) is:

## Sovereign Ratings

- AAA (non-UK)

*(Rating Description: AAA = Prime Rating, AA+, AA, AA- = High Grade Rating)*

Appendix 2 sets out the current list of countries that the Council can invest funds with.

The UK sovereign rating is currently AA. To ensure that the Treasury Function has capacity to operate effectively no specific minimum UK sovereign rating has been set out.

## Selection Criteria

- 70 Banks 1 - the Council will use UK and non-UK banks which have, as a minimum at least one of, the following Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors credit ratings (where rated):

	<b>Fitch</b>	<b>Moody's</b>	<b>Standard &amp; Poors</b>
Short Term	F1	P1	A-1
Long Term	A-	A3	A-

- 71 Investments will include term deposits, call accounts, notice accounts and Certificate of Deposits.
- Banks 2 – Part nationalised UK bank – Royal Bank of Scotland ring-fenced operations. This bank can be included provided it continues to be part nationalised or it meets the ratings in Banks 1 above.
  - Banks 3 – The Council's own bankers (HSBC, Lloyds and Barclays) for transactional purposes if the bank falls below the above criteria, although in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time.
  - Bank subsidiary and treasury operation - The Council will use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee or has the necessary ratings outlined above.
  - Building societies. The Council will use societies which meet the ratings for Banks 1 outlined above.
  - Money Market Funds (MMFs) Constant net asset value (CNAV)
  - Money Market Funds (MMFs) Low-Volatility net asset value (LVNAV)
  - Money Market Funds (MMFs) Variable net asset value (VNAV)
  - Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit rating of at least 1.25
  - Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds with a credit rating of at least 1.50
  - Cash Plus Funds
  - UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF))
  - Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation trusts

- m Local authorities, Police and Fire Authorities, Parish Councils, BCP Council Companies (Subsidiaries) and Partnerships.
- n Pooled Funds

### Maximum Time and Monetary Limits applying to Investments

72 The maximum amount that can be invested in any one institution at the time of the investment (including call accounts) as a percentage of the total investment portfolio has been reviewed and rationalised. All AA- and above rated institutions have a maximum limit of 25%, all A+, A or A- rated institutions have a maximum limit of 20%. For practical reasons where the average investment balance falls below £10m it may become necessary to increase the percentage limit to 33% at the time of investment (this only applies to call accounts and money market funds).

73 The maximum time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council's Counterparty List are as follows (these will cover both Specified and Non-Specified Investments):

	Long Term Rating	Money Limit	Time Limit
Banks 1 higher quality	AA-	25%	2 years
Banks 1 medium quality	A	20%	1 year
Banks 1 lower quality	A-	20%	6 months
Banks 2 category – part-nationalised RBS / Nat West	N/A	20%	2 years
Banks 3 category – Council's banker HSBC	AA-	25%	3 months
UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the DMADF)	AAA	25%	6 months
Local Authorities	N/A	20%	5 years
Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation Trusts	N/A	Fixed investment £14.9m	15 years
Money Market Funds CNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access
Money Market Funds LVNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access

Money Market Funds VNAV	AAA	25%	Instant access
Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds	N/A	25%	Unlimited
Cash Plus Funds	AAA	25%	Unlimited
UK Gilts	UK Sovereign Rate	25%	5 years

### **Use of additional information other than credit ratings**

74 Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment counterparties.

### **Investment strategy**

#### **In-house funds**

75 Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

#### **Investment returns expectations**

76 Bank Rate is forecast to increase from the current 0.25% in May 2022.

77 The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows (the long term forecast is for periods over 10 years in the future):

- 2022/23 0.50%
- 2023/24 0.75%
- 2024/25 1.00%
- 2025/26 1.25%

#### **Investment treasury limit**

78 The maximum period for investments will be 5 years except the Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation Trusts investment.

#### **Ethical Investing**

79 This is an area of investing that is becoming increasingly considered by financial institutions and customers. Products from financial institutions are growing but still remain limited. To consider investing in sustainable deposits they will still need to meet our counterparty criteria and parameters set out earlier in the strategy. Investment guidance, both statutory and from CIPFA, makes clear that all investing must adopt SLY principles – security, liquidity and yield: ethical issues must play a subordinate role to those priorities. The Treasury team will continue to explore this area and report to members of any further developments.



## **Treasury Management Policy, Practices and Schedules**

80 The Treasury Management Policy, Practices and Schedules will be presented alongside this 2022/23 update of the TM Strategy.

## **Appendices**

Appendix 1 - Economic Background and interest rate forecasts

Appendix 2 - Approved Countries for investments

## **Appendix 1: Economic Background (provided by Link Asset Services)**

### **COVID-19 vaccines.**

These were the game changer during 2021 which raised high hopes that life in the UK would be able to largely return to normal in the second half of the year. However, the bursting onto the scene of the Omicron mutation at the end of November, rendered the initial two doses of all vaccines largely ineffective in preventing infection. This has dashed such hopes and raises the spectre again that a fourth wave of the virus could overwhelm hospitals in early 2022. What we now know is that this mutation is very fast spreading with the potential for total case numbers to double every two to three days, although it possibly may not cause so much severe illness as previous mutations. Rather than go for full lockdowns which heavily damage the economy, the government strategy this time is focusing on getting as many people as possible to have a third (booster) vaccination after three months from the previous last injection, as a booster has been shown to restore a high percentage of immunity to Omicron to those who have had two vaccinations. There is now a race on between how quickly boosters can be given to limit the spread of Omicron, and how quickly will hospitals fill up and potentially be unable to cope. In the meantime, workers have been requested to work from home and restrictions have been placed on large indoor gatherings and hospitality venues. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in sectors like restaurants, travel, tourism and hotels which had been hit hard during 2021, but could now be hit hard again by either, or both, of government restrictions and/or consumer reluctance to leave home. Growth will also be lower due to people being ill and not working, similar to the pingdemic in July. The economy, therefore, faces significant headwinds although some sectors have learned how to cope well with Covid. However, the biggest impact on growth would come from another lockdown if that happened. The big question still remains as to whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread until tweaked vaccines become widely available.

### **A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE FUTURE PATH OF BANK RATE**

- In December, the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing in the current business cycle in western economies as recovery progresses from the Covid recession of 2020.
- The next increase in Bank Rate could be in February or May, dependent on how severe an impact there is from Omicron.
- If there are lockdowns in January, this could pose a barrier for the MPC to putting Bank Rate up again as early as 3<sup>rd</sup> February.
- With inflation expected to peak at around 6% in April, the MPC may want to be seen to be active in taking action to counter inflation on 5<sup>th</sup> May, the release date for its Quarterly Monetary Policy Report.
- The December 2021 MPC meeting was more concerned with combating inflation over the medium term than supporting economic growth in the short term.
- Bank Rate increases beyond May are difficult to forecast as inflation is likely to drop sharply in the second half of 2022.
- However, the MPC will want to normalise Bank Rate over the next three years so that it has its main monetary policy tool ready to use in time for the next down-turn; all rates under 2% are providing stimulus to economic growth.
- We have put year end 0.25% increases into Q1 of each financial year from 2023 to recognise this upward bias in Bank Rate - but the actual timing in each year is difficult to predict.

- Covid remains a major potential downside threat in all three years as we ARE likely to get further mutations.
- How quickly can science come up with a mutation proof vaccine, or other treatment, – and for them to be widely administered around the world?
- Purchases of gilts under QE ended in December. Note that when Bank Rate reaches 0.50%, the MPC has said it will start running down its stock of QE.

## **MPC MEETING 16<sup>H</sup> DECEMBER 2021**

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 8-1 to raise Bank Rate by 0.15% from 0.10% to 0.25% and unanimously decided to make no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish in December 2021 at a total of £895bn.

The MPC disappointed financial markets by not raising Bank Rate at its November meeting. Until Omicron burst on the scene, most forecasters, therefore, viewed a Bank Rate increase as being near certain at this December meeting due to the way that inflationary pressures have been comprehensively building in both producer and consumer prices, and in wage rates. However, at the November meeting, the MPC decided it wanted to have assurance that the labour market would get over the end of the furlough scheme on 30<sup>th</sup> September without unemployment increasing sharply; their decision was, therefore, to wait until statistics were available to show how the economy had fared at this time.

**On 10<sup>th</sup> December we learnt of the disappointing 0.1% m/m rise in GDP** in October which suggested that economic growth had already slowed to a crawl even before the Omicron variant was discovered in late November. Early evidence suggests growth in November might have been marginally better. Nonetheless, at such low rates of growth, the government's "Plan B" COVID-19 restrictions could cause the economy to contract in December.

**On 14<sup>th</sup> December, the labour market statistics** for the three months to October and the single month of October were released. The fallout after the furlough scheme was smaller and shorter than the Bank of England had feared. The single-month data were more informative and showed that LFS employment fell by 240,000, unemployment increased by 75,000 and the unemployment rate rose from 3.9% in September to 4.2%. However, the weekly data suggested this didn't last long as unemployment was falling again by the end of October. What's more, the 49,700 fall in the claimant count and the 257,000 rise in the PAYE measure of company payrolls suggests that the labour market strengthened again in November. The other side of the coin was a further rise in the number of vacancies from 1.182m to a record 1.219m in the three months to November which suggests that the supply of labour is struggling to keep up with demand, although the single-month figure for November fell for the first time since February, from 1.307m to 1.227m.

These figures by themselves, would probably have been enough to give the MPC the assurance that it could press ahead to raise Bank Rate at this December meeting. However, the advent of Omicron potentially threw a spanner into the works as it poses a major headwind to the economy which, of itself, will help to cool the economy. The financial markets, therefore, swung round to expecting no change in Bank Rate.

**On 15<sup>th</sup> December we had the CPI inflation** figure for November which spiked up further from 4.2% to 5.1%, confirming again how inflationary pressures have been building sharply. However, Omicron also caused a sharp fall in world oil and other commodity prices; (gas and electricity inflation has generally accounted on average for about 60% of the increase in inflation in advanced western economies).

**Other elements of inflation are also transitory** e.g., prices of goods being forced up by supply shortages, and shortages of shipping containers due to ports being clogged have caused huge increases in shipping costs. But these issues are likely to clear during 2022, and

then prices will subside back to more normal levels. Gas prices and electricity prices will also fall back once winter is passed and demand for these falls away.

Although it is possible that the Government could step in with some **fiscal support for the economy**, the huge cost of such support to date is likely to pose a barrier to incurring further major economy wide expenditure unless it is very limited and targeted on narrow sectors like hospitality, (as announced just before Christmas). The Government may well, therefore, effectively leave it to the MPC, and to monetary policy, to support economic growth – but at a time when the threat posed by rising inflation is near to peaking!

This is the adverse set of factors against which the MPC had to decide on Bank Rate. For the second month in a row, the MPC blind-sided financial markets, this time with a **surprise increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25%**. What's more, the hawkish tone of comments indicated that the MPC is now concerned that inflationary pressures are indeed building and need concerted action by the MPC to counter. This indicates that there will be more increases to come with financial markets predicting 1% by the end of 2022. The 8-1 vote to raise the rate shows that there is firm agreement that inflation now poses a threat, especially after the CPI figure hit a 10-year high this week. The MPC commented that "there has been significant upside news" and that "there were some signs of greater persistence in domestic costs and price pressures".

On the other hand, it did also comment that "**the Omicron variant is likely to weigh on near-term activity**". But it stressed that at the November meeting it had said it would raise rates if the economy evolved as it expected and that now "these conditions had been met". It also appeared more worried about the possible boost to inflation from Omicron itself. It said that "the current position of the global and UK economies was materially different compared with prior to the onset of the pandemic, including elevated levels of consumer price inflation". It also noted the possibility that renewed social distancing would boost demand for goods again, (as demand for services would fall), meaning "global price pressures might persist for longer". (Recent news is that the largest port in the world in China has come down with an Omicron outbreak which is not only affecting the port but also factories in the region.)

On top of that, there were no references this month to inflation being expected to be below the **2% target in two years' time**, which at November's meeting the MPC referenced to suggest the markets had gone too far in expecting interest rates to rise to over 1.00% by the end of the year.

These comments indicate that there has been a material reappraisal by the MPC of the inflationary pressures since their last meeting and the Bank also increased its forecast for inflation to peak at 6% next April, rather than at 5% as of a month ago. However, as the Bank retained its guidance that only a "**modest tightening**" in policy will be required, it cannot be thinking that it will need to increase interest rates that much more. A typical policy tightening cycle has usually involved rates rising by 0.25% four times in a year. "Modest" seems slower than that. As such, the Bank could be thinking about raising interest rates two or three times next year to 0.75% or 1.00%.

In as much as a considerable part of the inflationary pressures at the current time are indeed **transitory**, and will naturally subside, and since economic growth is likely to be weak over the next few months, this would appear to indicate that this tightening cycle is likely to be comparatively short.

As for the timing of the next increase in Bank Rate, the MPC dropped the comment from November's statement that Bank Rate would be raised "in the coming months". That may imply another rise is unlikely at the next meeting in February and that May is more likely. However, much could depend on how adversely, or not, the economy is affected by Omicron in the run up to the next meeting on 3<sup>rd</sup> February. Once 0.50% is reached, the Bank would act to start

shrinking its stock of QE, (gilts purchased by the Bank would not be replaced when they mature).

**The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -

- Raising Bank Rate as “the active instrument in most circumstances”.
- Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
- Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
- Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

**US.** Shortages of goods and intermediate goods like semi-conductors, have been fuelling increases in prices and reducing economic growth potential. In November, CPI inflation hit a near 40-year record level of 6.8% but with energy prices then falling sharply, this is probably the peak. The biggest problem for the Fed is the mounting evidence of a strong pick-up in cyclical price pressures e.g., in rent which has hit a decades high.

**Shortages of labour** have also been driving up wage rates sharply; this also poses a considerable threat to feeding back into producer prices and then into consumer prices inflation. It now also appears that there has been a sustained drop in the labour force which suggests the pandemic has had a longer-term scarring effect in reducing potential GDP. Economic growth may therefore be reduced to between 2 and 3% in 2022 and 2023 while core inflation is likely to remain elevated at around 3% in both years instead of declining back to the Fed's 2% central target.

**Inflation hitting 6.8%** and the feed through into second round effects, meant that it was near certain that the Fed's meeting of 15th December would take aggressive action against inflation. Accordingly, the rate of tapering of monthly \$120bn QE purchases announced at its November 3rd meeting. was doubled so that all purchases would now finish in February 2022. In addition, Fed officials had started discussions on running down the stock of QE held by the Fed. Fed officials also expected three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. The first increase could come as soon as March 2022 as the chairman of the Fed stated his view that the economy had made rapid progress to achieving the other goal of the Fed – “maximum employment”. The Fed forecast that inflation would fall from an average of 5.3% in 2021 to 2.6% in 2023, still above its target of 2% and both figures significantly up from previous forecasts. What was also significant was that this month the Fed dropped its description of the current level of inflation as being “transitory” and instead referred to “elevated levels” of inflation: the statement also dropped most of the language around the flexible average inflation target, with inflation now described as having exceeded 2 percent “for some time”. It did not see Omicron as being a major impediment to the need to take action now to curtail the level of inflationary pressures that have built up, although Fed officials did note that it has the potential to exacerbate supply chain problems and add to price pressures.

**EU.** The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed **economic recovery** in early 2021 but the vaccination rate then picked up sharply. After a contraction of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%. With Q3 at 2.2%, the EU recovery was then within 0.5% of its pre Covid size. However, the arrival of Omicron is now a major headwind to growth in quarter 4 and the expected downturn into weak growth could well turn negative, with the outlook for the first two months of 2022 expected to continue to be very weak.

**November's inflation figures** breakdown shows that the increase in price pressures is not just due to high energy costs and global demand-supply imbalances for durable goods as services inflation also rose. Headline inflation reached 4.9% in November, with over half of that due to energy. However, oil and gas prices are expected to fall after the winter and so energy inflation



is expected to plummet in 2022. Core goods inflation rose to 2.4% in November, its second highest ever level, and is likely to remain high for some time as it will take a long time for the inflationary impact of global imbalances in the demand and supply of durable goods to disappear. Price pressures also increased in the services sector, but wage growth remains subdued and there are no signs of a trend of faster wage growth which might lead to *persistently* higher services inflation - which would get the ECB concerned. The upshot is that the euro-zone is set for a prolonged period of inflation being above the ECB's target of 2% and it is likely to average 3% in 2022, in line with the ECB's latest projection.

**ECB tapering.** The ECB has joined with the Fed by also announcing at its meeting on 16th December that it will be reducing its QE purchases - by half from October 2022, i.e., it will still be providing significant stimulus via QE purchases for over half of next year. However, as inflation will fall back sharply during 2022, it is likely that it will leave its central rate below zero, (currently -0.50%), over the next two years. The main struggle that the ECB has had in recent years is that inflation has been doggedly anaemic in sticking below the ECB's target rate despite all its major programmes of monetary easing by cutting rates into negative territory and providing QE support.

The ECB will now also need to consider the impact of **Omicron** on the economy, and it stated at its December meeting that it is prepared to provide further QE support if the pandemic causes bond yield spreads of peripheral countries, (compared to the yields of northern EU countries), to rise. However, that is the only reason it will support peripheral yields, so this support is limited in its scope.

The EU has entered into a **period of political uncertainty** where a new German government formed of a coalition of three parties with Olaf Scholz replacing Angela Merkel as Chancellor in December 2021, will need to find its feet both within the EU and in the three parties successfully working together. In France there is a presidential election coming up in April 2022 followed by the legislative election in June. In addition, Italy needs to elect a new president in January with Prime Minister Draghi being a favourite due to having suitable gravitas for this post. However, if he switched office, there is a significant risk that the current government coalition could collapse. That could then cause differentials between Italian and German bonds to widen when 2022 will also see a gradual running down of ECB support for the bonds of weaker countries within the EU. These political uncertainties could have repercussions on economies and on Brexit issues.

**CHINA.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of **2020**; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021.

However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back in **2021** after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and looks likely to be particularly weak in 2022. China has been struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through using sharp local lockdowns - which depress economic growth. Chinese consumers are also being very wary about leaving home and so spending money on services. However, with Omicron having now spread to China, and being much more easily transmissible,

this strategy of sharp local lockdowns to stop the virus may not prove so successful in future. In addition, the current pace of providing boosters at 100 billion per month will leave much of the 1.4 billion population exposed to Omicron, and any further mutations, for a considerable time. The **People's Bank of China** made a start in December 2021 on cutting its key interest rate marginally so as to stimulate economic growth. However, after credit has already expanded by around 25% in just the last two years, it will probably leave the heavy lifting in supporting growth to fiscal stimulus by central and local government.

Supply shortages, especially of coal for power generation, were causing widespread power cuts to industry during the second half of 2021 and so a sharp disruptive impact on some sectors of the economy. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

**WORLD GROWTH.** World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum in the second half of the year, though overall growth for the year is expected to be about 6% and to be around 4-5% in 2022. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. While headline inflation will fall sharply, core inflation will probably not fall as quickly as central bankers would hope. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

**SUPPLY SHORTAGES.** The pandemic and extreme weather events, followed by a major surge in demand after lockdowns ended, have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. Major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China built up rapidly during quarters 2 and 3 of 2021 but then halved during quarter 4. Such issues have led to a misdistribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. The latest additional disruption has been a shortage of coal in China leading to power cuts focused primarily on producers (rather than consumers), i.e., this will further aggravate shortages in meeting demand for goods. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods available to purchase.

## **Appendix 2: Approved countries for investments**

AA-

- United Kingdom

AA

- France

AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland